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THE CENTRALITY OF THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION IN
AMERICAN LEGAL DEVELOPMENT
PAUL FINKELMAN*
At first glance slavery in the United States seems anomalous, a relic
of an earlier age that somehow survived the Revolution, with its empha-
sis on natural rights and its assertion that all people "are created equal."I
The title of the most influential and important history of American slav-
ery, Kenneth Stampp's The Peculiar Institution,2 suggests the way most
Americans have traditionally looked at slavery. That a neo-abolitionist
historian, publishing two years after Brown,3 thought slavery was "pecu-
liar" should not surprise us. But even antebellum Southerners often re-
ferred to slavery as their "peculiar institution."' 4 On the eve of the Civil
War, white Southerners, while they extolled the value of slavery, knew
their system of organizing labor and controlling race relations was unac-
ceptable to much of the world. It was truly peculiar.
In contrast to Stampp, in 1981 Orlando Patterson, a sociologist, ar-
gued that the "peculiar institution" was a misnomer for slavery. He
claimed that "[t]here is nothing notably peculiar about the institution of
slavery. It has existed from before the dawn of human history right
down to the twentieth century, in the most primitive of human societies
and in the most civilized." 5 Patterson found slavery in every "region on
earth" and concluded that "probably there is no group of people whose
ancestors were not at one time slaves or slaveholders." 6
I. THE PECULIARITY AND THE CENTRALITY OF
AMERICAN SLAVERY
In a number of ways Stampp and Patterson are both right. In the
* Associate Professor of History, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University; B.A.
1971, Syracuse University; M.A., Ph.D., 1976 University of Chicago; Fellow in Law and History
(1982-83 Harvard Law School). I thank Peter Wallenstein, Michael Kent Curtis, and David Q.
Burgess for their helpful comments on this article.
I. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
2. KENNETH STAMPP, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION: SLAVERY IN THE ANTEBELLUM
UNITED STATES (1956).
3. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
4. STAMPP, supra note 2, at 3.




United States slavery was simultaneously peculiar and prosaic. Patter-
son shows, and the articles by Alan Watson and Jacob Corr6 in this Sym-
posium reaffirm, 7 that slavery has existed in most societies. Specialized
monographs on slavery in numerous cultures reaffirm this analysis."
Only in the last third of the twentieth century has the world been without
widespread, legalized human bondage. Surely, slavery per se has never
been a peculiar institution. However, as the great classical scholar M.I.
Finley notes, the United States South was one of only five places in the
world to have developed not merely slavery, but a slave society.9 More-
over, by 1861 the racially based slavery of the American South was dif-
ferent-peculiar-both when compared to human bondage in other
times and places, and as it fit into the political structure of the United
States.
Slavery was an oddity that ran counter to the professed ideals of the
Nation, and yet it was deeply imbedded in the social, political, and legal
structure of the Nation. It undermined the "more perfect Union"' 0 cre-
ated by the Constitution, but at the same time was both protected by that
Constitution and woven into the Nation's constitutional fabric. " Slavery
seemed contrary to the Nation's common law tradition, and yet it helped
shape and develop much of American common law. After 1804 slavery
was peculiar to the South, but much of the North shared the racial views
of the South.1 2 Before the Civil War the Supreme Court endorsed these
7. Alan Watson, Thinking Property at Rome, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1355 (1993) [hereinafter
Watson, Thinking Property]; Alan Watson, Seventeenth-Century Jurists, Roman Law, and the Law of
Slavery, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1343 (1993) [hereinafter Watson, Seventeenth Century Jurists]; Ja-
cob I. Corr6, Thinking Property at Memphis: An Application of Watson, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1373
(1993).
8. The range of work on slavery is dramatic. E.g., M.I. FINLEY, ANCIENT SLAVERY AND
MODERN IDEOLOGY (1980) (hereinafter FINLEY, ANCIENT SLAVERY]; CLASSICAL SLAVERY (M.I.
Finley ed., 1987); RUTH MAZO KARRAS, SLAVERY AND SOCIETY IN MEDIEVAL SCANDINAVIA
(1988); CARL 0. WILLIAMS, THRALDOM IN ANCIENT ICELAND (1937); WILLIAM D. PHILLIPS, JR.,
SLAVERY FROM ROMAN TIMES TO THE EARLY TRANSATLANTIC TRADE (1985); EHUD R.
TOLEDANO, THE OTTOMAN SLAVE TRADE AND ITS SUPPRESSION: 1840-1890 (1982); SLAVERY
AND OTHER FORMS OF UNFREE LABOUR (Lbonie J. Archer ed., 1988); RICHARD HELLIE, SLAV-
ERY IN RUSSIA, 1450-1725 (1982); SLAVERY IN AFRICA: HISTORICAL AND ANTHROPOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVES (Suzanne Miers & Igor Kopytoff eds., 1977).
9. FINLEY, ANCIENT SLAVERY, supra note 8, at 9. The others were classical Greece, ancient
Rome, Brazil, and the Caribbean.
10. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
11. Paul Finkelman, Slavery and the Constitutional Convention: Making a Covenant With
Death, in BEYOND CONFEDERATION: ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN NATIONAL
IDENTITY 188 (Richard R. Beeman et al. eds., 1987); William M. Wiecek, Slavery and Abolition
before the United States Supreme Court, 1820-1860, 65 J. AM. HIST. 34 (1979). See generally WIL-
LIAM M. WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA, 1760-1848
(1977).
12. See generally LEON F. LITWACK, NORTH OF SLAVERY (1961). For a more nuanced analy-
sis of the rights of blacks in the North, see Paul Finkelman, Prelude to the Fourteenth Amendment:
Black Legal Rights in the Antebellum North, 17 RUTGERS L.J. 415 (1986).
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views as the law of the land. 13 Despite its geographical isolation, the
influence of slavery was felt nationally and internationally. It was recog-
nized and protected by national laws as well as the Constitution, and not
considered illegal under nineteenth-century notions of international
law. 14
Although apparently antithetical to American traditions of equality
and democracy, antebellum Southerners, and a good many Northerners
as well, had little trouble distinguishing between the rights of free white
Americans and the disabilities of enslaved black Americans. 15 Indeed,
by the eve of the Civil War some Southerners argued that democracy in
America was only possible because of slavery. The racial inferiority of
blacks, these Southerners argued, relegated them to permanently dimin-
ished status. Because they were slaves, so the argument went, they could
never participate in politics. Instead, they provided what Senator James
Henry Hammond called a "mudsill" on top of which a democracy of
white men could be built. 16 Thus, the rights of life, liberty, and the pur-
suit of happiness proclaimed in the Declaration of Independence could
be universally applied to white Americans precisely because they were
not applied to blacks. This sort of defense was necessary because slavery
was peculiar within the context of the natural rights, liberal republican-
ism of nineteenth-century America. Roman masters, for example, did
not claim to believe in natural rights or equality and thus felt no need to
defend their institution. In Rome, "[i]deological openness was facilitated
by the nakedness of the oppression and exploitation: no 'false conscious-
ness' was necessary or possible."' 7 In Rome there was nothing peculiar
about slavery, and therefore no need to defend it. In America slavery
was very peculiar, and thus the master class felt the necessity of defend-
ing it at every turn.
II. RACE AND SLAVERY IN THE UNITED STATES
The defense of slavery that allowed it to coexist with American de-
13. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
14. See, for example, Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66
(1825), upholding the legality of the African slave trade under international law. For a discussion of
this case, see ROBERT COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
102-04 (1977). See also WIECEK, supra note 11.
15. For an extended discussion of the disabilities of American slaves, see ANDREW FEDE, PEO-
PLE WITHOUT RIGHTS (1992), reviewed in this Symposium in Ruth Wedgwood, The South Con-
demning Itself1 Humanity and Property in American Slavery, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1391 (1993).
16. James Henry Hammond, Speech on the Admission of Kansas, U.S. Senate, Mar. 4, 1858,
CONG. GLOBE, 35 Cong. No. Sess. 961-62, partially reprinted in SLAVERY DEFENDED: THE VIEWS
OF THE OLD SOUTH 121-25 (Erik McKitrick ed., 1963).
17. FINLEY, ANCIENT SLAVERY, supra note 8, at 117.
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mocracy was based on race. For Americans "race has always been the
central reality of slavery."1 8 For most of the history of the world race
was generally irrelevant to enslavement. Other New World cultures,
such as Brazil and Cuba, had racially based slavery. But none of them
maintained such rigid distinctions between the races. 19 Even St. Dom-
ingue (present day Haiti), arguably the most brutal slave culture in the
New World, had a large class of free people of color whose part-African
ancestry did not prevent them from achieving some wealth and elevated
status in that society.20 Thus, racially based slavery in the United States
was both peculiar and damaging, not only to the slaves and masters of
the time, but to the entire society then and now. Because slavery in the
United States "was black slavery," M.I. Finley argues that "even a
'purely historical' study of an institution now dead for more than a cen-
tury cannot escape being caught up in the urgency of contemporary
black-white tensions."
'2'
In other times and places enslavement was never confined to a single
race or ethnic group. Orlando Patterson's own work shows that in most
premodern societies enslavement might be the fate of anyone, at any
time. Historian Carl Degler notes that "[t]here was a time in antiquity
when anyone, regardless of nation, religion, or race, might be a slave." 22
Alan Watson's essays in this Symposium underscore this phenomenon.
Watson reminds us that most legal records of Roman slavery bear on the
enslavement of elite slaves who were often from the same class and race
as their masters.2 3 Indeed, the most striking aspect of Roman slavery,
for an Americanist, was the extent to which enslavement had nothing to
do with race.24 Enslavement could happen to anyone regardless of race
18. David Brion Davis, Slavery and the American Mind, in PERSPECTIVES AND IRONY IN
AMERICAN SLAVERY 59 (Harry P. Owens ed., 1976).
19. CARL N. DEGLER, NEITHER BLACK NOR WHITE: SLAVERY AND RACE RELATIONS IN
BRAZIL AND THE UNITED STATES (1971) (comparing slavery and race relations in Brazil and the
United States).
20. C.L.R. JAMES, THE BLACK JACOBINS: TOUSSAINT L'OUVERTURE AND THE SAN DOM-
INGO REVOLUTION (Allison & Busby rev. ed. 1980) (1938).
21. FINLEY, ANCIENT SLAVERY, supra note 8, at 11.
22. Carl N. Degler, The Irony of American Slavery, in PERSPECTIVES AND IRONY IN AMERI-
CAN SLAVERY 19 (Harry P. Owens ed., 1976).
23. Watson, Seventeenth-Century Jurists, supra note 7, at 1347-48.
24. M.I. Finley argues that "racism" was a factor in ancient slavery, "despite the absence of the
skin-colour stigma; despite the variety of peoples who made up the ancient slave populations; despite
the frequency of manumission and its peculiar consequences." FINLEY, ANCIENT SLAVERY, supra
note 8, at 118. Thus, it was "commonplace in Roman Republican speeches that Jews, Syrians,
Lydians, Medes, indeed all Asiatics are 'born to slavery.'" Id. at 119. "Racism" in this context is
really ethnocentrism and about the attitude of masters to the "barbarian" outsiders who made up the
bulk of the slave population in the ancient world. However, despite his use of the term "racism"
Finley notes the importance of color and "race" in the New World, and that it created a slave system
quite different from that of the ancient world.
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or ancestry. As M.I. Finley observes, although most classical slaves were
"barbarians" from other cultures, there were also "Greek slaves in
Greece [and] Italian slaves in Rome .... *"25 Similarly, there were Chi-
nese slaves in China, Africans enslaved by Africans, and Russians en-
slaved by other Russians. Europeans enslaved each other throughout the
ancient world and well into the modem period. 26
If anyone might be a slave, freedom was a realistic possibility for
slaves in many cultures. Once emancipated, a Roman slave ceased to
carry the burden of his former status. "At a stroke [of the pen]," Finley
writes, a slave "ceased to be a property. In juristic terms, he was 'trans-
formed from an object to a subject of rights, the most complete metamor-
phosis one can imagine.' He was now a human being unequivocally, in
Rome even a citizen."' 27 Under Roman law "when a Roman citizen freed
one of his slaves, barring certain circumstances the latter automatically
acquired Roman citizenship himself."'28 As Alan Watson has noted, this
rule was "unique in the ancient world for its liberality. '"29
What was not unique for the ancient world, however, is the lack of
racial stigma attached to enslavement. Former slaves in Rome, and in
many other cultures, could rise to the highest levels of society. The Bibli-
cal story of Joseph shows that in the ancient Near East it was not im-
plausible to believe someone could rise from enslavement to the highest
level of political power. 30 Unlike "[f]reedmen in the New World" who
"carried an external sign of their slave origin in their skin colour, even
after many generations," slaves in the ancient world who became free
''simply melted into the total population within one or at the most two
generations." 3t In Rome "tens of thousands of freedmen's sons" rose
"into a world remote from that of the masses .... ,,32
This was impossible-unfathomable-in the United States, where
25. FINLEY, ANCIENT SLAVERY, supra note 8, at 118.
26. In the 1940s Germans enslaved their fellow countrymen (as well as Russians, Poles, and
other Europeans). Those sent to German industries as slaves or sent to German slave labor camps
(as opposed to death camps like Auschwitz) were often physically indistinguishable from those who
commanded their labor. However, under German theories of race, those enslaved were designated
as members of different races or as politically corrupted.
27. FINLEY, ANCIENT SLAVERY, supra note 8, at 97 (footnotes omitted).
28. Id.
29. ALAN WATSON, ROMAN LAW AND COMPARATIVE LAW 11 (1991).
30. Genesis 39-41. Whether the story of Joseph is accurate or not (or even happened at all) is
irrelevant. My point here is that no one doubted it could have happened, despite the fact that Joseph
was a Hebrew living in Egypt. It is of course impossible to imagine an African American slave
gaining his freedom and becoming an advisor to a political leader at anytime before the Civil War.
31. FINLEY, ANCIENT SLAVERY, supra note 8, at 97.
32. Id. at 98. This was also a result in Africa, where "slaves could often anticipate the gradual
assimilation of their descendants into the social mainstream." JAMES OAKES, SLAVERY AND FREE-
DOM: AN INTERPRETATION OF THE OLD SOUTH 32 (1990).
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slavery was defined by race. White people 33 in the South were always
free, or, if held as indentured servants or apprentices, were in a position
to become free in the future.34 Only people with some African ancestry
could be slaves; no one else, no matter how great their misfortune, could
end up enslaved. While courts struggled at the margins to determine
who might be black and therefore subject to enslavement, 35 Southerners
never doubted for a moment that, as South Carolina's highest court put
it, "By law, every negro is presumed to be a slave .... ,,36
While some blacks in the South ceased to be slaves, freedom only
relieved them of the burdens of servitude; it could never lead to full
equality. Free blacks in the South were better off than enslaved blacks,
but they remained second class members of society. 37 Even those few
free blacks who owned substantial amounts of property-including
slaves-faced a precarious existence that might be shattered by a change
in public policy or popular sentiments. 38 The South limited the rights of
free blacks much as it did slaves. Thus, Southern states denied free
blacks the right to testify against whites in court, 39 banned them from
33. It is impossible to find clear and consistent definitions of race in the colonial or antebellum
South. Throughout the slaveholding South people who were of predominately European or Native
American ancestry were held as slaves and considered "black" even though their outward appear-
ance suggested otherwise. I have taken a stab at discussing this problem in Paul Finkelman, The
Color of Law, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 937, 950-57 (1993); Paul Finkelman, The Crime of Color, 67 TUL.
L. REV. 2063 (1993) [hereinafter Finkelman, The Crime of Color].
34. North Carolina's Chief Justice Thomas Ruffin discussed at length the distinction between
slaves and emancipated white children or apprentices in the famous case of State v. Mann, 13 N.C.
(2 Dev.) 229 (1829). The U.S. Constitution also recognized this distinction. In determining repre-
sentation in the House of Representatives, the Constitution counted "Persons... bound to Service
for a Term of Years" with other free persons, and then added to that number "three fifths of all
Persons." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, para. 3.
35. E.g., Gobu v. Gobu, I N.C. 188 (1802); Hudgins v. Wrights, 11 Va. (I Hen. & M.) 134
(1806); Addle v. Beauregard, I Mart. 183 (La. 1810).
36. State v. Harden, 29 S.C.L. (2 Speers) 151n, 155n (1832). By the late seventeenth century
every American jurisdiction followed the rule ofpartus sequitur ventrem. Under this rule the chil-
dren of female slaves were themselves slaves, even if their fathers were free and white. By the nine-
teenth century this meant that some people who were held as "Negro" slaves were only of one-eighth
or one-sixteenth African ancestry. These people appeared to be white, and according to some statu-
tory definitions of race were in fact considered white. But they were also slaves in a society where
only "Negroes" could be enslaved. On the adoption of the laws creating slavery through matrilineal
descent, see A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, IN THE MATTER OF COLOR, RACE, AND THE AMERICAN
LEGAL PROCESS: THE COLONIAL PERIOD 43-44, 159, 194 (1978).
37. IRA BERLIN, SLAVES WITHOUT MASTERS: THE FREE NEGRO IN THE ANTEBELLUM
SOUTH (1974) (historical study of free blacks in the South); JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, THE FREE
NEGRO IN NORTH CAROLINA, 1790-1860 (1969) (classic study of free blacks in antebellum North
Carolina).
38. MICHAEL P. JOHNSON & JAMES L. ROARK, BLACK MASTERS: A FREE FAMILY OF
COLOR IN THE OLD SOUTH (1984) (describing the limitations on free blacks in antebellum South
Carolina who were relatively wealthy but still living on a precarious edge between slavery and
freedom).
39. Thomas D. Morris, Slaves and the Rules of Evidence in Criminal Trials, 68 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 1209 (1993).
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schools and certain professions,40 forbid them from owning firearms, 4'
and limited or prohibited their physical movements. 42 On the eve of the
Civil War Arkansas moved to expel free blacks from the state. 43
Blacks who lived in the antebellum North were far better off than
their Southern counterparts," although they never had full equality.45
Racial prejudice growing out of slavery became rooted in the colonial
period, 46 and remained strong in some parts of the North well after slav-
ery expired in that region. Moreover, even where Northern states re-
jected much of the racism associated with slavery, blacks in the North, as
James and Lois Horton describe in this Symposium, were unable to fully
escape the danger of enslavement posed by the federal fugitive slave
laws.
47
At the federal level neither slaves nor free blacks could hope for any
protection. In Dred Scott48 Chief Justice Roger B. Taney nationalized
Southern concepts of race. He found that under the Constitution blacks
"had no rights which the white man was bound to respect. ' 49 Applying
a rigorous, although not necessarily accurate, intentionalist argument to
determine the rights of blacks under the Constitution, 50 Taney found
"that neither the class of persons who had been imported as slaves, nor
their descendants, whether they had become free or not, were then ac-
knowledged as a part of the people, nor intended to be included in the
general words used in that memorable instrument."'
40. BERLIN, supra note 37, at 304-05, 96-97.
41. Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, The Second Amendment: Toward an Afro-
Americanist Reconsideration, 80 GEO. L.J. 309, 325 (1991).
42. For example, most Southern states prohibited free blacks from entering their jurisdiction,
even on a temporary basis. Most of the Southern coastal states provided for the imprisonment of
free black sailors from the North or the British Empire, if the sailors entered their ports. The black
seamen would be released only when their ship sailed, and after their captains had paid for their
maintenance while in jail. The only litigation on this was Elkison v. Deliesseline, 8 F. Cas. 493, 494
(D.S.C. 1823) (No. 4,366). For discussion of this problem, see Paul Finkelman, The Constitution
and the Intentions of the Framers: The Limits of Historical Analysis, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 349, 386-90
(1989).
43. 1860 Ark. Acts 62, 99.
44. Finkelman, supra note 12.
45. See generally LITWACK, supra note 12.
46. Finkelman, The Crime of Color, supra note 33. For a discussion of the non-legal aspects of
race and slavery in colonial America, see generally DAVID BRION DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF SLAV-
ERY IN WESTERN CULTURE (1964); EDMUND MORGAN, AMERICAN SLAVERY-AMERICAN FREE-
DOM: THE ORDEAL OF COLONIAL VIRGINIA (1975); WINTHROP JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK
(1968).
47. See James Oliver Horton & Lois E. Horton, A Federal Assault: African Americans and the
Impact of the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1179 (1993).
48. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
49. Id. at 407. For a thorough history of this case, see DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED
SCOTr CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN LAW AND POLITICS (1978).
50. Finkelman, supra note 42, at 390.
51. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 407.
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Even emancipation and over a century of freedom has not removed
the stigma of enslavement for African Americans. After the Civil War
the Fourteenth Amendment presumably protected blacks from state
sanctioned discrimination. But, as Andrew Kull notes, only one court in
the post-Civil War era seems to have interpreted the new amendment to
prohibit segregation in public schools.52 Derrick Bell believes that to this
day African Americans see their "slave heritage. . . more [as] a symbol
of dishonor than a source of pride. It burdened black people with an
indelible mark of difference as we struggled to be like whites."' 53 In the
end, American slavery was peculiar because all the slaves were defined by
race.54
III. AMERICAN IDEOLOGY AND SLAVERY
The Nation's self-proclaimed political credo made American slavery
especially peculiar. Yet, Americans were able to accommodate slavery
within their ideology. The ideological peculiarity of American slavery
emerges out of the essential conflict between human bondage and the
philosophical basis of the United States as a nation-state: "We hold these
truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are
endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights; that among
these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness.1 55 On its face Jef-
ferson's fine phrasing seems to be the essence of antislavery rhetoric.
Thus, "[e]ven the most radical abolitionists could not free themselves
from the reverential awe with which their generation looked back upon
the demigods of 1776."56 In urging slaves to throw off their chains (and
urging whites to assist them) even the radical black abolitionist David
Walker quoted the Declaration of Independence in his revolutionary
Appeal.57
A. Northern Responses to the Declaration
Certainly in the Northern part of the new Nation, some people acted
on the premises of the Declaration of Independence. During and after
52. Andrew Kull, A Nineteenth-Century Precursor of Brown v. Board of Education: The Trial
Court Opinion in the Kansas School Case of 1881, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1199 (1993).
53. Derrick Bell, Learning the Three "I's" ofAmerica's Slave Heritage, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
1037, 1038 (1993).
54. Although most premodern societies did not define slavery by race, the most horrible exam-
ple of modem slavery-Nazi Germany's use of slave labor-also used race (as the Germans defined
it) as the criterion for enslavement.
55. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
56. DAVID BRION DAVIS, SLAVERY AND HUMAN PROGRESS 150 (1984).
57. DAVID WALKER, APPEAL, IN FOUR ARTICLES, TOGETHER WITH A PREAMBLE TO THE
COLORED CITIZENS OF THE WORLD... (1829).
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the Revolution various opponents of slavery relied on the language of
natural rights and the experience of the War to explain or justify their
views. 58 Thus, the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 echoed Jeffer-
son's language, declaring that, "All men are born free and equal, and
have certain natural and inalienable rights, among which may be reck-
oned the right of defending their lives and liberties; that of acquiring,
possessing and protecting property, and in fine of seeking and obtaining
their safety and happiness." 59 Three years later, in Commonwealth v.
Jennison,6° the Supreme Court of Massachusetts interpreted this clause,
in light of the Revolution, to have ended slavery. Chief Justice William
Cushing wrote:
Sentiments more favorable to the natural rights of mankind, and to
that innate desire for liberty which heaven, without regard to complex-
ion or shape, has planted in the human breast-have prevailed since
the glorious struggle for our rights began. And these sentiments led
the framers of our constitution of government-by which the people of
this commonwealth have solemnly bound themselves to each other-to
declare-that all men are born free and equal; and that every subject is
entitled to liberty, and to have it guarded by the laws as well as his life
and property. In short . . .slavery is in my judgement as effectively
abolished as it can be by the granting of rights and privileges wholly
incompatible and repugnant to its existence. 61
Pennsylvania's legislature also acknowledged the force of Revolu-
tionary ideology and rhetoric. Thus, the preamble to the Pennsylvania
Gradual Abolition Act of 178062 notes:
When we contemplate our abhorrence of that condition, to which the
arms and tyranny of Great-Britain were exerted to reduce us, when we
look back on the variety of dangers to which we have been exposed,
and how miraculously our wants in many instances have been sup-
plied, and our deliverance wrought, when even hope and human forti-
tude have become unequal to the conflict, we are unavoidably led to a
serious and grateful sense of the manifold blessings, which we have
undeservedly received from the hand of that Being, from whom every
good and perfect gift cometh. Impressed with these ideas, we conceive
that it is our duty, and we rejoice that it is in our power, to extend a
portion of that freedom to others, which hath been extended to us, and
release from that state of thraldom, to which we ourselves were tyran-
nically doomed, and from which we have now every prospect of being
58. See, for example, the discussion in DAVID BRION DAVIS, SLAVERY IN THE AGE OF
REVOLUTION, 1780-1823, at 332-33 (1975).
59. MASS. CONST. of 1780, art. I.
60. The text of this unreported 1783 Massachusetts case is reprinted in PAUL FINKELMAN,
THE LAW OF FREEDOM AND BONDAGE 36 (1986).
61. Id. at 36-37.
62. An Act for the Gradual Abolition of Slavery, Act of Mar. 1, 1780, reprinted in FINKELMAN,




The Pennsylvania legislators noted that it was their duty to end bondage,
because the institution deprived "Negro and Mulatto slaves ... of the
common blessings that they were by nature entitled to" and also led to
the "unnatural separation and sale of husband and wife from each other
and from their children, an injury, the greatness of which can only be
conceived by supposing that we were in the same unhappy case." 64
Massachusetts and Pennsylvania led the way towards abolition in
the North. By 1804 Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and the new states
of Vermont and Ohio had abolished slavery outright, while Pennsylvania
and the rest of the North had passed gradual emancipation statutes
which placed the institution on the road to extinction. 65 From the adop-
tion of the Pennsylvania Gradual Emancipation statute until the eve of
the Civil War opponents of slavery would turn to the Declaration of In-
dependence to support their cause. For these visionaries, at least, Ameri-
can slavery was peculiar because freedom and equality were the true
basis of the Nation.
B. Southern Slave Owners and the Declaration
Thus, as slavery was becoming "peculiar" in the United States dur-
ing the Revolution, the contradiction between the rhetoric of freedom
and the reality of bondage in the new Nation was readily apparent. The
man who wrote the Declaration, after all, owned some 175 slaves, and
took no steps to liberate them during the contest with England, or at any
other time in his long life.66 While thousands of individual Southern
slaves gained their freedom during the Revolution,67 the states south of
Pennsylvania remained committed to slavery. The best Virginia could
offer was a statute allowing masters to free their slaves68 and an act to
protect the freedom of former slaves who had served in the Revolution-
63. Id. § 1.
64. Id.§2.
65. These laws were adopted in Pennsylvania (1780), Connecticut (1784), Rhode Island (1784),
New York (1799), and New Jersey (1804). The history of this is discussed in ARTHUR ZILVERSMIT,
THE FIRST EMANCIPATION: THE ABOLITION OF SLAVERY IN THE NORTH (1967).
66. Paul Finkelman, Jefferson and Slavery: "Treason Against the Hopes of the World" in JEF-
FERSONIAN LEGACIES 181 (Peter S. Onuf ed., 1993). During his life and in his will Jefferson freed a
total of eight slaves--all of whom were members of the Hemings family. These slaves were the
children and grandchildren of Jefferson's father-in-law, John Wayles, and thus related to Jefferson
through marriage. Jefferson made no effort to change the status of the three to four hundred other
slaves he owned in the fifty years between the signing of Declaration, on July 4, 1776, and his death,
exactly fifty years later, on July 4, 1826. Id. at 204-07.
67. See generally BENJAMIN QUARLES, THE NEGRO IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1961);
BERLIN, supra note 37, at 16-25.
68. An Act to authorize the manumission of slaves, 1782 Va. Acts ch. LXI.
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ary armies.69 Moreover, with slave owners like Washington and Jeffer-
son leading the struggle against Great Britain, there was little likelihood
of any dramatic change in the status of human bondage in the new
Nation.
These ironies were not lost on British opponents of American inde-
pendence. The English tory Samuel Johnson pointedly asked, "How is it
that we hear the loudest yelps for liberty among the drivers of ne-
groes?" 70 Even some of America's British friends were concerned by the
hypocrisy of revolutionary slaveholders. Thomas Day, an English sup-
porter of independence, thought it "truly ridiculous" to see "an Ameri-
can patriot, signing resolutions of independency with the one hand, and
with the other brandishing a whip over his affrighted slaves."
7'
The Southern masters who were fighting so hard for their own lib-
erty dodged such criticism. Virginia's first constitution contained a Dec-
laration of Rights which had a "free and equal" clause that mirrored the
Declaration of Independence. 72 However, the Virginia framers carefully
drafted their Declaration to finesse the issue of slavery. The document
declared that:
All men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain
inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they
cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the
enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possess-
ing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety.
73
In his first draft of this clause George Mason had written that all
men were "born equally free." Virginia's slaveholders were uncomforta-
ble with this language. Robert Carter Nicholas, for example, declared
this was "the forerunner or pretext of civil convulsion."' 74 Thus, the dele-
gates replaced "born equally free" with "are by nature equally free."'75
The legislature also added the phrase "when they enter into a state of
society" to qualify when natural rights actually attached to individuals.
76
69. An Act directing the emancipation of certain slaves who have served as soldiers in this
state, and for the emancipation of the slave Aberdeen, 1783 Va. Acts ch. CXC.
70. Quoted in DONALD L. ROBINSON, SLAVERY IN THE AGE OF REVOLUTION, 1765-1820, at
80 (1971).
71. Quoted in DAVIS, supra note 58, at 398-99.
72. But actually predated it. Virginia's legislators agreed to the final draft of the state bill of
rights on June 12, 1776. 1 A.E. DICK HOWARD, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF VIR-
GINIA 58 n.2 (1974). See also 1 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE MASON, 1725-1792, at 275-77, 283-89
(Robert A. Rutland ed., 1970).
73. VA. CONST. of 1776, art. I, § 1, reprinted in 10 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTIONS 49 (William F. Swindler ed., 1979).
74. Quoted in I HOWARD, supra note 72, at 61 (footnotes omitted).




These two changes avoided declaring that slaves were free, but acknowl-
edged that they might have some future claim to freedom that could be
grounded in natural rights. Significantly, this language also implicitly
acknowledged that slavery violated the natural rights doctrines at the
foundation of the new Nation.
Edmund Randolph noted that these changes were "not without in-
consistency." ' 77 However, Virginia's politicians were unconcerned about
a foolish consistency. 78 Revolutionary-era Virginia, was, after all, a
slaveholding republic.
In Hudgins v. Wrights79 Virginia's highest court adopted this posi-
tion, even though the author of the opinion personally would have pre-
ferred a different analysis. The case involved a family (the Wrights) of
mixed racial ancestry, claimed as slaves by Hudgins.
At trial Chancellor George Wythe of the Richmond District Court
of Chancery, declared the Wrights free on two grounds. The first was
racial: they lacked any visible features of Negroes, and appeared to be of
white and American Indian ancestry. As such, they could not be held as
slaves. Second, Wythe declared that slavery itself was illegal in Virginia,
because it violated the state's Declaration of Rights. 80
Virginia's highest court upheld Chancellor Wythe's decision to free
the Wrights with an important analysis of the role of race in American
slavery. However, Judge St. George Tucker, who was one of the few
politicians in Virginia to publicly propose an end to slavery in the state,
8t
emphatically rejected Wythe's abolitionist application of the Virginia
Declaration of Rights:
I do not concur with the Chancellor in his reasoning on the operation
of the first clause of the Bill of Rights, which was notoriously framed
with a cautious eye to this subject, and was meant to embrace the case
of free citizens, or aliens only; and not by a side wind to overturn the
rights of property, and give freedom to those very people whom we
have been compelled from imperious circumstances to retain, gener-
ally, in the same state of bondage that they were in at the revolution, in
which they had no concern, agency or interest.82
77. Id.
78. "A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, adored by little statesmen and phi-
losophers and divines." Ralph Waldo Emerson, Essays. First Series, quoted in JOHN BARTLETT,
FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 497 (Emily Morrison Beck ed., 15th ed., 1980).
79. 11 Va. (I Hen & M.) 134 (1806).
80. Wythe's opinion has not survived, but the nature of it is made clear by Tucker's opinion in
Hudgins, 11 Va. (1 Hen. & M.) at 141, 144.
81. ST. GEORGE TUCKER, A DISSERTATION ON SLAVERY: WITH A PROPOSAL FOR THE
GRADUAL ABOLITION OF IT, IN THE STATE OF VIRGINIA (1796). See also Wedgwood, supra note
15.
82. Hudgins, 11 Va. (I Hen. & M.) at 141.
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Virginia's most important modem state constitutional theorist, A.E.
Dick Howard, argues that "in Lockean terms" the changes made in the
final draft of the Declaration of Rights were "hardly tenable, and the fact
that revolutionary Virginians held slaves remained an anomaly. '8 3 Cer-
tainly at first glance the language seems merely cumbersome, rather than
particularly exclusionary. But contemporary Virginians, as Judge
Tucker's opinion showed, clearly understood the significance of the
change. If they were out of step with Locke, they were in step with their
own society. There was clearly nothing anomalous about Virginians
owning slaves-they had been doing so for more than a century. How-
ever, slavery was clearly anomalous within the context of Lockean no-
tions of natural rights,8 4 and to that extent it was "peculiar" in the new
Nation.
Eventually Southerners went further, with some categorically re-
jecting the ideology of the Declaration of Independence. In 1826 John
Randolph of Roanoke asserted that the Declaration was "a most perni-
cious falsehood." 85 Edmund Ruffin, one of the South's earliest secession-
ists, thought the Declaration was a dangerous document. John C.
Calhoun "labeled the idea of equality a 'false doctrine,' only 'hypotheti-
cally true,' that had been 'inserted' in the Declaration of Independence
'without any necessity.' ",86 James Henry Hammond of South Carolina
sneered at the "fine sounding and sentimental" language of the
Declaration. 8
7
In 1854 George Fitzhugh provided an elaborate proslavery attack
on the Declaration. Fitzhugh believed that the United States was
founded on "abstractions" that were "professed falsely." s88 He candidly
asserted that "men are not born physically, morally or intellectually
equal" and, contrary to the ideology of the Declaration, "[t]heir natural
83. 1 HOWARD, supra note 72, at 62.
84. Although it is not at all clear what Locke would have thought, he helped draft, along with
his patron, Anthony Ashley Cooper, Earl of Shaftsbury, the Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina.
That document provided, "Every freeman of Carolina, shall have absolute power and authority over
his negro slaves, of what opinion or religion soever." The Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina
§ 110 (1669), reprinted in I STATUTES AT LARGE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 55 (1836). Tucker's opinion
also hints that continued ownership of slaves was not inconsistent with regard to Lockean notions of
property and the formation of political communities. Hudgins, 11 Va. (1 Hen. & M.) at 141.
85. Quoted in WILLIAM S. JENKINS, PRO-SLAVERY THOUGHT IN THE OLD SOUTH 60 (1935).
86. 2 THE FREDERICK DOUGLASS PAPERS: SERIES ONE: SPEECH, DEBATES, AND INTER-
VIEWS, 1847-54, at 488, n.15 (John W. Blassingame ed., 1982).
87. Quoted in HARVEY WISH, GEORGE FITZHUGH: PROPAGANDIST OF THE OLD SOUTH 96
(1943).




inequalities beget inequalities of rights."'8 9 Some people, including all
blacks, were born "weak in mind or body." 9 Fitzhugh believed that
"[n]ature has made them slaves; all that law and government can do, is
to regulate, modify and mitigate their slavery." 91 He argued that on his-
torical grounds "'[l]ife and liberty' are not 'inalienable;' they have been
sold in all countries, and in all ages, and must sold be so long as human
nature lasts."' 92 Slavery, in Fitzhugh's mind, was not peculiar, but funda-
mental to society. He believed the North, not the South, had a peculiar
institution-freedom. He argued that the purpose of government was
"to restrict, control and punish man 'in the pursuit of happiness.' 93
Thus, the preamble to the Declaration was "verbose, newborn, false, and
unmeaning."' 94 The Declaration was "exuberantly false, and arbores-
cently fallacious."' 95 Fitzhugh and other proslavery theorists argued that
all men were not created equal, but that inequality was common, natural
and universal. Rejecting the Declaration and its theories of equality,
many Southerners instead developed their own proslavery arguments, ul-
timately asserting that slavery was a positive good for the slave and the
master.
9 6
Other Southerners continued to endorse the Declaration, but denied
it could affect slavery. Some Southerners took the road marked out by
the Virginia Court in Hudgins.97 They argued that the Declaration-like
its Virginia counterpart-only applied to citizens or political communi-
ties. Slaves were naturally excluded from these.98 One Virginia Con-
gressman argued that "no ingenuity" could "torture the Declaration of
Independence into having the remotest allusion to the institution of do-
mestic slavery." 99 Alexander Stephens, the future vice president of the
Confederacy, believed the Framers had established "the first great princi-
ples of self-government by the governing race.'' 00
The key for Stephens, and other Southern supporters of the Declara-
89. Id. at 177-78.
90. Id. at 178. The implication of Fitzhugh's analysis is that some whites were fit for slavery as
well. See id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 179.
93. Id. at 180.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 182.
96. See generally JENKINS, supra note 85; EUGENE D. GENOVESE, THE WORLD THE SLAVE-
HOLDERS MADE (1969).
97. 11 Va. (1 Hen. & M.) 134 (1806).
98. JENKINS, supra note 85, at 156-57.
99. Quoted in JAMES OAKES, THE RULING RACE: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN SLAVEHOLDERS
143 (1982).
100. Quoted in id.
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tion, was of course race. Race made it possible for slave owners to accept
the credo of America because they could reject its application to their
own slaves. Thus, one Louisiana slave owner affirmed that all men were
created "free and equal as the Declaration of Independence holds they
are."' 10 1 He then added, "But all men, niggers, and monkeys aint."'
' 0 2
While Calhoun, Fitzhugh, and other white Southerners rejected the
Declaration because it undermined slavery, other masters "frequently
made the Fourth of July a holiday for their slaves."' 1 3 It may seem
ironic that masters took their slaves to barbecues and other celebrations
of the signing of the Declaration of Independence. But for the master
class this probably seemed appropriate. Independence, after all, allowed
the American slave owner to develop the political and legal system that
perpetuated and strengthened slavery.
No one understood this better than the Nation's best known black
abolitionist, Frederick Douglass. He admitted that the Declaration did
not apply to him. Douglass asked, "What have I, or those I represent, to
do with your national independence? Are the great principles of political
freedom and of natural justice, embodied in that Declaration of Indepen-
dence, extended to us?' 1 4 Douglass wished "to God" that an "affirma-
tive answer could be truthfully returned to these questions!"' 0 5 But it
could not. With a "sad sense" Douglass admitted:
I am not included within the pale of this glorious anniversary! Your
high independence only reveals the immeasurable distance between us.
The blessings in which you, this day, rejoice, are not enjoyed in com-
mon. The rich inheritance of justice, liberty, prosperity and indepen-
dence, bequeathed by your fathers, is shared by you, not by me. The
sunlight that brought life and healing to you, has brought stripes and
death to me. This Fourth [of] July is yours, not mine. You may
rejoice, I must mourn. To drag a man in fetters into the grand illumi-
nated temple of liberty, and call upon him to join you in joyous an-
thems, were inhuman mockery and sacrilegious irony.10° 6
IV. THE ISOLATION OF AMERICAN SLAVERY
Compounding the conflict between American ideology and slavery
was the evolution of slavery as a sectional institution. Although the sign-
101. Quoted in id.
102. Quoted in id.
103. Id. at 142.
104. Frederick Douglass, What to the Slave is the Fourth of July? An Address Delivered in Roch-
ester. New York, on 5 July 1852, reprinted in 2 THE FREDERICK DOUGLASS PAPERS: SERIES ONE:
SPEECH, DEBATES, AND INTERVIEWS, 1847-54, at 359, 367 (John W. Blassingame ed., 1982).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 368.
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ers of the Declaration of Independence represented thirteen slaveholding
states, by the time of the ratification of the Constitution, five states had
ended slavery outright or were gradually abolishing it; by 1804 half the
Nation had taken steps to end slavery. 10 7
This geographical isolation also led to increasing political weakness
for slavery. By 1810 the Northern population had surpassed that of the
South, and thus the free states dominated the House of Representa-
tives. 10 8 In the next half century this Northern domination of the House
became overwhelming. After the admission of California to the Union in
1850, there were sixteen free states in the country and only fifteen slave
states. By the time of Lincoln's election in 1860 eighteen of the states
prohibited slavery, while in fifteen the institution remained legal. When
the Civil War began American slavery was geographically and culturally
peculiar; more free states were on the horizon, with Kansas and Colo-
rado joining the Nation before the end of the Civil War. 109
In addition to controlling the House, the North now controlled the
Senate as well. The 1860 presidential election showed that the North
could control the White House. Without getting a single electoral vote
from any slave state, Abraham Lincoln won 180 electoral votes, while
the combined total of his three opponents was only 123.110 By 1860 slav-
ery's geographical isolation undermined its political position within the
country.
By this time American slavery was also peculiar because it was iso-
lated in an international context. Orlando Patterson is clearly correct
that, with the exception of the present era, slavery has always been wide-
spread. Throughout most of human history there has been nothing "pe-
culiar" about human bondage. But, by 1861 the racially based slavery of
the United States was "peculiar" because it could be found only in the
107. See generally ZILVERSMIT, supra note 65; PAUL FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION:
SLAVERY, FEDERALISM, AND COMITY chs. 1-2 (1981). By this time Massachusetts (1780), New
Hampshire (1784), and two new states, Vermont (1791) and Ohio (1803) had abolished slavery out-
right in their constitutions, while Pennsylvania (1784), Connecticut (1784), Rhode Island (1784),
New York (1799), and New Jersey (1804) had adopted gradual emancipation statutes which would
end slavery over time.
108. The whole population of the country was 9,638,453 in 1820. In that year the ten Southern
states had a total population of 4,298,199. The free population in the South was 2,802,010 and the
slave population was 1,496,189. The North had a free population of just under 5,340,000 people.
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, NEGRO POPULATION, 1790-1915, at 57 (1918).
109. West Virginia also joined the Union during the Civil War, but the addition of this free state
could not have been anticipated before the War, and indeed happened only because of the War.
110. Stephen Douglas won 12 electoral votes, including 3 from the Northern state of New
Jersey. John C. Breckinridge won 72 votes from the Deep South, while John C. Bell got 39 electoral
votes from the Upper South. THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 103 (Mark S. Hoffman
et al. eds., 1992).
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American South, Spain's few remaining New World colonies, and Bra-
zil.III By this time England, France, and the Netherlands had abolished
slavery in their New World colonies. South of the Rio Grande, Spain's
once gigantic mainland empire was now independent and without slav-
ery. In the context of the Atlantic community, slavery was increasingly
considered cruel and uncivilized. Symbolic of the South's isolation was
the 1856 Republican Party pledge "to prohibit in the Territories those
twin relics of barbarism-Polygamy, and Slavery.""12 Once the domi-
nant form of labor in the New World, slavery was now an isolated relic
of a less enlightened and barbaric age.
V. THE PECULIARITIES OF AMERICAN SLAVE LAW
The political and geographic isolation of the slave South had a sig-
nificant impact on the development of Southern legal culture." 3 South-
ern legal culture was distinctive in a variety of ways, but at the root of
this distinctiveness was slavery.
As some of the essays in this symposium demonstrate, Southern
courts and legislatures developed special-peculiar-legal rules to ac-
commodate slavery to Anglo-American' 14 legal traditions.' 'I Politicians
also made legal and constitutional arguments peculiar to their own sec-
tion, to support the defining economic and social institution of the South.
Judith Schafer" 16 and Thomas Morris" 17 show how Southern jurists
and legislators shaped certain aspects of the criminal and civil law not
only to accommodate slavery, but also to rationalize and bolster it.
American slavery was sufficiently different from the common law that
111. Eugene Genovese argues that slaveholders "stood alongside the slaveholding planters of
Brazil and Cuba, alongside the Russian lords... [a]nd as late as 1861 the southern slaveholders also
stood alongside such dying but still deadly landholding classes as those of Poland, Hungary, Italy,
and Japan, which commanded unfree or only technically free labor in regimes even then looked upon
as barbarous by both the bourgeois and laboring classes of Western Europe." Eugene D. Genovese,
Slavery-The World's Burden, in PERSPECTIVES AND IRONY IN AMERICAN SLAVERY 30 (Harry P.
Owens ed., 1976). He also compares Southern slave owners to the Junkers of Germany. But, these
comparisons do not work well. Certainly, most Southern masters did not see themselves in the same
camp with despotic, antidemocratic landowners of Europe or Asia.
112. Republican Party Platform, 1856, quoted in JAMES M. MCPHERSON, ORDEAL BY FIRE 99
(2d ed. 1993). The reference to polygamy was an attack on the Mormon community in Utah.
113. Paul Finkelman, Exploring Southern Legal History, 64 N.C. L. REV. 77 (1985); AN UN-
CERTAIN TRADITION: CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE HISTORY OF THE SOUTH (Kermit Hall &
James W. Ely, Jr. eds., 1989); AMBIVALENT LEGACY: A LEGAL HISTORY OF THE SOUTH (David J.
Bodenhamer & James W. Ely, Jr. eds. 1984).
114. Or, in the case of Professor Schafer's article to both Franco-American and Anglo-American
traditions. Judith K. Schafer, "Details Are of a Most Revolting Character".- Cruelty to Slaves as Seen
in Appeals to the Supreme Court of Louisiana, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1283 (1993).
115. Eg., id.; Morris, supra note 37; Wedgwood, supra note 81.
116. Schafer, supra note 114.
117. Morris, supra note 37.
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Southern law makers had to develop their own peculiar rules to accom-
modate the institution. Schafer's article and the case she has edited'"
both reveal the willingness of Southern judges to allow treatment of
slaves that violated both traditional notions of human decency and well-
developed common law rights of individuals. Morris shows how the sta-
tus of slaves and the racial prejudices of whites limited the testimony of
blacks and created contradictions within the common law that made it
impossible to prosecute anyone for some crimes.
Despite internal contradictions, William Fisher finds many "coher-
ent" aspects of American slave law which to a great extent defined slaves
and blacks.' ' 9 Thomas Russell's discussion of the role of South Caro-
lina's courts in the sale of slaves underscores the internal rationality and
coherence of American slave law by describing how the normal, every-
day functioning of commercial and probate law affected slavery. Seen
through Russell's lens, slavery, and especially the law of slavery, is not
peculiar, or strange. It is common, banal. While the whip remains the
symbol of the authority of the master class for the day-to-day operations
of slavery, Russell teaches us that the auctioneer's hammer is not an in-
appropriate symbol for the effect of law on slaves and masters alike.
Russell's article also sheds further light on the role of the slave auc-
tion in Southern society. Slave owners "recoiled from the spectacle of
the slave auction" and "masters frequently-though by no means al-
ways-faced the necessity of selling slaves with sincere if effusive hand-
wringing."' 120 The courts, as Russell demonstrates, often relieved mas-
ters of the unpleasant task of selling slaves. The courts also provided an
orderly mechanism to insure that slaves would be sold to satisfy debts,
settle estates, and in other ways keep the system going. For the courts
there was nothing peculiar about slaves-they were property to be sold
like any other form of property. James Oakes argues persuasively that,
"Slave auctions were ceremonies of degradation, symbolic reenactments
of the violence of original enslavement, potent reminders of the slave's
powerlessness and dishonor."'
2'
Thus, through the mundane courthouse auction the legal system
threw its weight, and its not inconsiderable symbolic representation of
law, justice, and fairness, behind the buying and selling of slaves. Rus-
118. Judith K. Schafer, Sexual Cruelty to Slaves: The Unreported Case of Humphreys v. Utz, 68
CHi.-KENT L. REV. 1313 (1993).
119. William W. Fisher III, Ideology and Imagery in the Law of Slavery, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
1051 (1993).
120. JAMES OAKES, SLAVERY AND FREEDOM: AN INTERPRETATION OF THE OLD SOUTH 22
(1990).
121. Id. at 24.
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sell's article, combined with the analysis of Oakes and other historians of
slavery, presents us with the frightening image of blind justice with the
chains of a slave in one hand and an auctioneer's hammer in the other.
22
Despite the application of normal rules of probate, contract, and
foreclosure to slavery, the use of courts to buy and sell people in United
States is jarring. Still it underscores the foreignness-the peculiarity-of
slavery to American legal culture. Indeed, the "coherent" American
slave law that Professor Fisher finds had one main thrust: to fit slavery
into the system of Anglo-American common law, which of course had
traditional restraints and rules that were absolutely antithetical to most
aspects of slavery. Thus, as Fisher notes, unlike the common law rule
that children followed the status of their father, the status of African
American children was determined by that of their mother. Further-
more, slaves were "deprived of many civil rights and liberties: they could
not make contracts or other legally binding choices, sue or be sued, ac-
quire property, legally marry, or (with rare exceptions) testify against
whites." 12
3
Andrew Fede's recent book, People Without Rights, reviewed by
Ruth Wedgwood in this symposium, goes well beyond Fisher's analysis
of the rights of slaves, concluding they had no rights at all. Professor
Wedgwood finds Fede's position too extreme, and she reminds us that
custom and day-to-day practice created rights for some slaves. 124 Cer-
tainly Wedgwood is correct that not all rights are legal rights. Indeed,
Wedgwood shows, that at least on some occasions Southern courts seem
to have protected the customary rights of slaves even when there was no
institutional reason to do so.' 25 However, the very fact that this protec-
tion is so rare supports the thrust of Fede's argument, even though he
may have overargued his case.
Underscoring the debate about American slavery is Alan Watson's
Thinking Property at Rome, which shows that in a different legal regime
a slave might in fact acquire property, make a contract, and even bind his
master to an agreement.126 Jacob Corr6, looking at cases from Tennes-
see, notes in Thinking Property at Memphis, 127 that American judges also
122. Northerners were particularly disgusted by slave auctions in the District of Columbia.
Thus, one of the "victories" for the North in the compromise of 1850 was the abolition of the slave
trade in the Nation's capitol. In return the South gained the infamous fugitive slave law of 1850,
which, as James and Lois Horton show in this Symposium, imperiled the lives of blacks throughout
the North. Horton & Horton, supra note 47.
123. Fisher, supra note 119, at 1052 (footnotes omitted).
124. Wedgwood, supra note 15, at 1391-92.
125. Id. at 1392-93.
126. Watson, Thinking Property, supra note 7.
127. CorrE, supra note 7.
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faced problems when slaves acted as "thinking property," but that a key
difference between Rome and the United States was that Roman "slaves
performed functions that slaves in the United States were likely never to
have performed."' 28 They could not perform these tasks because the ra-
cial basis of slavery in republican Tennessee and elsewhere in the South
precluded acknowledging that slaves were capable of such tasks.
29 If
they could routinely perform "thinking" tasks, then slaves would have
been "created equal" to whites, and thus deserving of their freedom.
Similarly, the peculiarity of slavery in the American South forced
masters to create an ideological defense of their institution that was
rooted in theories about the race of those who were enslaved.13
0 This
defense, like the effect of slavery on Southern society, was ultimately
seamless. A defense of slavery based on scientific theories of racial ine-
quality, 13, for example, justified the institution in the minds of those who
bought the argument, 132 but did not protect the institution from those
who remained unpersuaded by the proslavery racial theory. The same
was true for the elaborate biblical justification of slavery articulated by
armies of Southern ministers. 133 Southerners accepted the argument,
which comforted them with the knowledge that their behavior was sanc-
tioned by God; Northerners generally rejected this interpretation of the
Bible, and abolitionists rooted their opposition to slavery in Judeo-Chris-
tian values.
Not surprisingly, Southerners developed their own peculiar notions
about the meaning of the Constitution in order to defend slavery. As
Michael Kent Curtis demonstrates, because they could not win the de-
bate over slavery on the merits of the institution, Southerners sought to
stop the debate altogether. 134 Southerners would limit the meaning of
the First Amendment and the Speech and Debate Clause of the Constitu-
128. Id. at 1387.
129. Another reason why slaves could not be allowed to do such tasks stemmed from the secur-
ity needs of the South. The master class feared that if slaves could read, write, and perform profes-
sional tasks--such as practicing medicine or pharmacy-they would be in a position to escape from
slavery, poison their masters, or lead revolts.
130. Fisher, supra note 119, at 1056-57.
131. E.g., WILLIAM R. STANTON, THE LEOPARD'S SPOTS: SCIENTIFIC ATTITUDES TOWARD
RACE IN AMERICA, 1815-1860 (1960); JOSIAH NorT, TYPES OF MANKIND (1854); and various arti-
cles in 15 ARTICLES ON AMERICAN SLAVERY: MEDICINE, DEMOGRAPHY, AND SLAVERY (Paul
Finkelman ed., 1989).
132. Eg., GEORGE FITZHUGH, SOCIOLOGY FOR THE SOUTH (1854); I.A. NEWBY, CHALLENGE
TO THE COURT: SOCIAL SCIENTISTS AND THE DEFENSE OF SEGREGATION, 1954-1966, at 8-9
(1967).
133. E.g., Thorton Stringfellow, A Scriptural View of Slavery, reprinted in SLAVERY DEFENDED:
THE VIEWS OF THE OLD SOUTH 86 (Erik McKitrick ed., 1963); and various articles II in ARTICLES
ON AMERICAN SLAVERY: RELIGION AND SLAVERY (Paul Finkelman ed., 1989).
134. Michael Kent Curtis, The 1859 Crisis over Hinton Helper's Book, The Impending Crisis:
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tion to preclude any meaningful discussion of slavery. Thus, Hinton
Rowan Helper, a white native son of North Carolina, could not remain
in his home state after publishing his attack on slavery, The Impending
Crisis, and Southern congressmen attempted to punish their Northern
colleagues for endorsing or supporting that book.
135
That Helper accepted prevailing Southern views of the racial inferi-
ority of African Americans only underscored the threat his book posed
to the peculiar institution. Since the creation of the American Nation,
thoughtful Southerners like Thomas Jefferson, 136 and less thoughtful
ones like Senator James Henry Hammond, 137 had argued that race made
slavery necessary, proper, and possible. Slavery, they argued, was not in
the end peculiar, precisely because the race of people who made up the
slaves was peculiarly suited for enslavement. Helper threatened slavery
precisely because he accepted the racism of the slave owners, but turned
it into an argument against the perpetuation of the institution.
VI. SLAVERY AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM
The debate over Hinton Helper's book suggests the importance of
slavery in American public law. Here we see in sharp focus the peculiar-
ity of slavery and its simultaneous centrality to American society and
American life from the Revolution to the Civil War. Its legacy remains
with us today. Judith Shklar, for example, acknowledges the importance
of sexism and the destructive results of "ungenerous and bigoted immi-
gration and naturalization policies" in shaping American concepts of cit-
izenship. 138 But she notes that the "effects and defects" of these policies
"pale before the history of slavery and its impact upon our public
attitudes." 13
9
Essays in this symposium reach similar conclusions. Sanford Levin-
son powerfully argues that our Constitutional structure developed
around slavery and we cannot fully understand modern Constitutional
law without devoting some time and effort to studying the law of slav-
ery.140 Similarly, James and Lois Horton's discussion of responses to the
Free Speech, Slavery, and Some Light on the Meaning of the First Section of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1113 (1993).
135. HINTON ROWAN HELPER, THE IMPENDING CRISIS OF THE SOUTH AND How TO MEET
IT (1857).
136. For a discussion of Jefferson's defenses of slavery and his racism, see Paul Finkelman, supra
note 66, at 181-221.
137. James Henry Hammond, supra note 16.
138. JUDITH SHKLAR, AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP THE QUEST FOR INCLUSION 13-14 (1991).
139. Id. at 14.




Fugitive Slave Law of 1850141 illustrates how slavery made the Constitu-
tion come alive-in often horrible ways-for antebellum Americans who
might otherwise have happily never encountered the Constitution or the
legislation it spawned.' 42 Michael Kent Curtis shows how slavery col-
lided with ideas of freedom of speech, freedom of press, and representa-
tive government, and thus helped shape the antebellum constitution. 43
Even after the Civil War, slavery shaped constitutional interpretation, as
the document edited by Andrew Kull shows. 144 And, Derrick Bell re-
minds us here,' 45 and in much of his other work, 46 that the legacy of
slavery, and the racism it spawned, continues to haunt our social and
political structure as well as our legal system.
The word slavery does not appear in the Constitution until the Thir-
teenth Amendment, which abolished the institution. 47 Nevertheless, the
main body of the document is littered with references to slaves as "other
Persons,"' 48 "such Persons,"' 149 and "person held to Service or La-
bour." 150  Through these clauses the South gained representation in
Congress (and the electoral college) for its slaves; Congress was prohib-
ited from interfering with the slave trade before 1808;151 and masters
gained the right to recover fugitive slaves from other states. Throughout
the Constitutional Convention the framers talked frankly about slavery,
although in the end they decided not to use the term in the final docu-
ment because they feared it would undermine support for ratification in
the North.
In addition to those clauses specifically relating to slavery a number
of other provisions of the document protected the institution by empow-
ering Congress to call "forth the Militia" to "suppress Insurrections,"
141. 9 Stat. 462 (1850).
142. Horton & Horton, supra note 47, at 16.
143. Curtis, supra note 134.
144. Kull, supra, note 52.
145. Bell, supra note 53.
146. DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE
(1987); DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM
(1992).
147. "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the
party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to
their jurisdiction." U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
148. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
149. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 1.
150. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3.
151. The Migration and Importation Clause of Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution has often
been misconstrued to have required the end of the slave trade in 1808. It did not in fact require
anything; it merely prohibited a ban on the trade before 1808. Article V reinforced this provision by
prohibiting any amendment of the slave trade provision before 1808.
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including slave rebellions;' 52 prohibiting taxes on all exports and prohib-
iting state taxes on imports, thus preventing an indirect tax on slavery by
taxing the staple products of slave labor, such as tobacco, rice, and even-
tually cotton; 53 providing for the indirect election of the president
through an electoral college based on congressional representation,
which incorporated slaves into the scheme through the Three-Fifths
Clause, thus giving whites in slave states a disproportionate influence in
the election of the president.
54
Finally, the structure of the Constitution ensured against emancipa-
tion by the new federal government. Article V requires a three-fourths
majority of the states to amend the Constitution, thus ensuring that the
slaveholding states would have a perpetual veto over any constitutional
changes.' 5 5 Because the Constitution created a government of limited
powers, Congress lacked the power to interfere in the domestic institu-
tions of the states.'5 6 Thus, during the ratification debates only the most
fearful Southern anti-Federalists opposed the Constitution on the
grounds that it threatened slavery.' 57 Most Southerners, even those who
opposed the Constitution for other reasons, agreed with General Charles
Cotesworth Pinckney of South Carolina, who told his state's house of
representatives:
We have a security that the general government can never emancipate
152. U.S. CONT. art. I, § 8, cl. 15. The abolitionist Wendell Phillips considered this clause, and
a similar one in art. IV, § 4, to be among the five key proslavery provisions of the Constitution.
WENDELL PHILLIPS, THE CONSTITUTION A PRO-SLAVERY COMPACT; OR, SELECTIONS FROM THE
MADISON PAPERS vi (2d ed. 1845).
153. U.S. CONT. art. I, §§ 9, cl. 5, 10, cl. 2.
154. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2. Without the extra electoral votes that the South received by
counting slaves under the three-fifths clause, Thomas Jefferson would not have been elected Presi-
dent in 1800. Rather his nonslaveholding opponent John Adams of Massachusetts would have been
re-elected President.
155. Had all 15 slave states remained in the Union, they would to this day be able to prevent an
amendment on any subject. In a 50-state union, it takes only 13 states to block any amendment.
156. Under various clauses of the Constitution the Congress might have protected, limited, or
prohibited the interstate slave trade, art. I, § 8, cl. 3, slavery in the District of Columbia or on
military bases, art. I, § 8, cl. 17, or slavery in the territories, art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. None of these clauses
permitted Congress to touch slavery in the states. Some radical abolitionists argued that under the
Guarantee Clause, art. IV, § 4, Congress had the right to end slavery in the states. WIECEK, supra
note II at 269-71. For further discussion of slavery and the Guarantee Clause, see WILLIAM M.
WIECEK, THE GUARANTEE CLAUSE OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 133-65 (1972). The delegates in
Philadelphia did not debate these clauses with slavery in mind, although, the Commerce Clause was
accepted as part of a bargain over the African slave trade. Finkelman, supra note 11, at 209-23.
157. One such southerner was Patrick Henry, who used any argument he could find to oppose
the Constitution. Henry asserted at the Virginia ratifying convention that, "among ten thousand
implied powers which they may assume, they may, if we be engaged in war, liberate every one of
your slaves if they please." 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOP-
TION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 589 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836). Ironically, the im-




them, for no such authority is granted and it is admitted, on all hands,
that the general government has no powers but what are expressly
granted by the Constitution, and that all rights not expressed were re-
served by the several states. 158
VII. CONCLUSION
In 1863 Abraham Lincoln would reflect on the creation of the
American Nation. It began, according to Lincoln, in 1776 as one "dedi-
cated to the proposition that all men are created equal." 159 Lincoln was
rhetorically brilliant in reinterpreting the Declaration into a libertarian
credo that supported the Union war effort. But, as a matter of history
and law Lincoln was far from the mark.
Since the founding, slaves had constituted the second most valuable
form of privately held property in the Nation, after real estate. Further-
more, slaves constituted about twenty-five percent of the population of
the South. In 1790 the census found 697,642 slaves in the United
States. 160 Most of them lived in the South. By 1860 this population had
grown to 3,922,760, all of them in the South.161
It would have been unnatural and unreasonable for the Founders,
who were keenly aware of the importance of private property, not to
have protected this most important kind of property in their constitu-
tional and legal structure. As the articles in this Symposium show, the
Founders, and subsequent judges, legislators, and lawyers were not un-
mindful of their property interests in slavery and they protected them at
every level of their legal system.
Equally important, many of the Founders, and subsequent genera-
tions of Southern judges and politicians, also understood the racial basis
of slavery. Beyond the economic value of the system were its peculiar
racial characteristics that prevented southern whites from contemplating
abolition. With leaders like Thomas Jefferson refusing to even consider
the possibility of racial equality or emancipation within the United
States, the South created a legal regime for its section-and a constitu-
tional regime for the Nation-that protected slavery at every turn. The
result was a hardening of legal doctrine and constitutional interpretation
that precluded any peaceful end to slavery. This made slavery peculiar in
terms of American ideology and the liberalism of the mid-nineteenth-
158. 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FED-
ERAL CONSTITUTION 286 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836).
159. Abraham Lincoln, Address Delivered at the Dedication of the Cemetery at Gettysburg, in 7
COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 23 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).
160. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 108, at 57.
161. Id.
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century Atlantic community; but it also made slavery a fundamental and
entrenched legal and social institution that was impervious to legal or
political assault.
